Consultation on supervisory expectations for central counterparties seeking to accept tokenised collateral

News originally published by

Bank of England

1: Introduction

1.1. This supervisory statement (SS) sets out the Bank of England’s (Bank’s) expectations for central counterparties (CCPs) seeking to accept tokenised forms of collateral. The expectations set out follow the Bank’s principles-based and outcomes-focused approach.

1.2. The Bank considers that tokenised assets support innovation in central clearing and in the wider development of tokenised financial markets. The acceptance of tokenised assets by CCPs could support confidence in the adoption of tokenised collateral where these meet the relevant requirements and expectations.

1.3 This SS is concerned with tokenised forms of collateral that are eligible for use by a CCP under the Collateral Part of the Bank’s CCP Rulebook, as consulted upon in July 2025.footnote [15] As with non-tokenised assets, tokenised forms of collateral may be eligible as collateral at a CCP where they meet the relevant requirements in the CCP Rulebook and can be risk managed in a manner that safely supports the purpose of collateral. A CCP seeking to accept new collateral must follow the process set out under the draft statement of policy on the Bank’s approach to supervisory processes and margin permissions.footnote [16] New collateral includes all new collateral types with risks not identical to those already approved by the Bank, including where differences arise from the method of delivery, credit risk or liquidity profile.

1.4. This SS is relevant to all CCPs established in the UK and entities that are planning to apply to the Bank for a recognition order as a UK CCP under Section 290 of Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.footnote [17]

1.5. The Bank considers that CCPs’ acceptance of tokenised forms of assets currently eligible for use as collateral in central clearing may offer benefits to both CCPs and their members, including improved efficiency in collateral mobilisation, transfer and management.

1.6. The Bank supports responsible innovation and applies a proportionate, outcomes-focused and technology neutral approach to the supervision of FMIs, making space for its financial stability objective to be achieved in different ways. In supervising CCPs accepting tokenised collateral, the Bank will apply its existing approach to supervising FMIs,footnote [18] which is judgement-based, forward-looking, risk-based and proportionate.

1.7. This SS is intended to support innovation by reducing uncertainty around the Bank’s expectations for CCPs considering the acceptance of tokenised collateral. It does not prescribe particular technologies, legal structures or operational models for tokenised collateral. The Bank intends its expectations to be applicable across different tokenised collateral arrangements and developments in technology and market practice, provided the relevant regulatory outcomes continue to be achieved. These outcomes include supporting effective risk management and orderly default management in both normal and stressed market conditions.

1.8. This SS is structured as follows:

  • Section 2 explains the key concepts used in this SS. These are provided solely to assist interpretation and are not intended to establish legal, regulatory or technical definitions.
  • Section 3 sets out the Bank's supervisory expectations regarding CCP acceptance of tokenised collateral, focusing on liquidity, valuation and interoperability; credit and concentration risk; settlement finality and certainty of ownership; operational resilience; and custody and safeguarding. Section 3 also includes illustrative examples of how CCPs may apply these expectations when considering tokenised collateral acceptance.
Particularly relevant rules in the Bank’s CCP Rulebook

1.9. The expectations in this SS are grounded in, and should be read alongside, the CCP rules set out in the CCP Rulebook and relevant CCP-applicable rules and supervisory expectations (hereon ‘applicable requirements’).

1.10. While a CCP should consider all applicable provisions of the CCP Rulebook, the Bank considers the Collateral Part, Review and Testing of Models and Parameters Part, Management and Governance Part, Investment Policy Part, Margin Part and Operational Resilience Part, to be particularly pertinent to the matters discussed in Chapter 3 of this SS, alongside the Fundamental Rules. CCPs should also have regard to relevant international standards, including the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure (PFMI).

1.11. This SS does not limit, replace or amend any applicable requirements and should not be interpreted as identifying all provisions relevant to the acceptance of tokenised collateral.

2: Key concepts

Use of terminology

2.1. The concepts used in this SS are provided solely to assist interpretation of the expectations set out and are not intended to provide established legal, regulatory or technical definitions. They also do not supersede terminology used elsewhere in legislation, regulation or supervisory guidance.

Settlement finality

2.2. Settlement finality refers to the point at which a transfer of an asset becomes irrevocable and unconditional. In the context of a tokenised collateral arrangement, it may be useful to distinguish between contractual settlement finality and legal settlement finality.

2.3. Contractual settlement finality generally describes the point within a tokenised arrangement at which a transaction is treated as final according to the rules of the token arrangement. This does not, by itself, establish legal settlement finality.

2.4. Legal settlement finality generally refers to the principle that, after a certain point specified once settled, the transfer of an asset cannot be unwound, revoked or challenged in the event of the insolvency of a participant in a designated system. In the UK, for designated systems, this protection is provided under the Settlement Finality Regulations.footnote [19]

Tokenisation-related terms

2.5. Tokenisation refers to the process of creating a digital representation of an asset using distributed ledger technology (DLT) or similar technologies on a programmable platform.

2.6. Tokenised collateral refers to collateral that has been tokenised, including digital representation of rights, ownership or interests in collateral.

2.7. Tokenised collateral arrangement refers to the end-to-end legal, governance, operational, technological and other arrangements through which such tokenised collateral is issued, represented, held, transferred or managed or realised.

2.8. Tokeniser generally describes an entity that creates a tokenised representation of an asset issued on a programmable platform.

3: The Bank’s expectations regarding tokenised forms of eligible collateral accepted by CCPs

3.1. The expectations in this section do not create additional requirements for collateral, nor are they intended to imply that tokenised collateral is inherently more risky than non-tokenised collateral.

3.2. The Bank does not expect CCPs to apply these considerations as binary tests nor to presume that the identification of a particular risk should automatically determine the outcome of a collateral assessment. Rather, CCPs should consider all relevant factors and determine whether any risks arising from a tokenised collateral arrangement can be appropriately managed and be able to demonstrate how they have reached that assessment. CCPs must continue to follow regulatory approval processes before accepting new forms of collateral, and decisions on whether a CCP’s internal risk management frameworks are adequate will also need to be considered as part of the CCP’s own governance processes. The considerations in this section are intended to inform, rather than determine, those judgements.

Liquidity, valuation and interoperability

3.3 A CCP should demonstrate that it has considered how a tokenised collateral arrangement would operate in practice and its ability to transfer and realise the collateral within required timeframes, in both normal and stressed conditions. While these dynamics may change as the market for tokenised assets grows, and the depth of and participation in these markets adjusts, a CCP should demonstrate that it has considered factors affecting liquidity and realisability of the tokenised collateral based on the evidence available at the time of application.

Liquidity and valuation characteristics of the tokenised collateral

3.4. A CCP should assess whether any features of a tokenised collateral arrangement could materially affect the liquidity, valuation or realisability of the collateral. Relevant considerations may include how liquidity is generated and evidenced, how prices are formed, the availability and reliability of market data, whether tokenised and non-tokenised forms are readily convertible, and the extent to which liquidity relies on conventional markets, tokenised markets or interactions between the two.

3.5. As an example of how an existing rule may apply in the tokenised context, in assessing compliance with Rule 8.3 in the Collateral Part of the CCP Rulebook, which requires a CCP to mark-to-market its collateral on a near to real-time basis and, where this is not possible, to manage the related risks, a CCP should understand whether differences between tokenised and non-tokenised markets could affect the reliability of information used to value collateral in both normal and stressed market conditions. Where a non-tokenised equivalent exists, a CCP should understand any material differences in the liquidity characteristics between tokenised and non-tokenised forms. For tokenised collateral with actively traded non-tokenised equivalents, a CCP should assess the liquidity characteristics of the tokenised collateral in its own right, as well as the extent to which liquidity may be supported by conventional markets and arrangements facilitating conversion between tokenised and non-tokenised forms. In doing so, a CCP should understand the basis on which tokenised collateral is valued, including the relationship between any token price and the value of any underlying asset, and whether valuation inputs remain reliable during periods of market stress.

3.6. For instance, a token linked to an underlying bond held and settled through a CSD may benefit from the liquidity and price discovery available in the conventional market for the underlying bond. However, a CCP should not assume that the tokenised collateral exhibits the same liquidity characteristics as its non-tokenised equivalent. Where the tokenised and conventional markets operate on different schedules, liquidity conditions and price formation may diverge, particularly where trading in the tokenised asset continues during periods where the conventional market is closed. There may also be correlated demand for liquidation across tokenised and non-tokenised forms of the same asset. A CCP should consider this in the context of their risk mitigation measures.

3.7. For tokenised collateral where no equivalent conventional markets exist, a CCP should adopt an appropriately conservative methodology and assess, on an ongoing basis, how market depth and liquidity evolve over time and whether adjustments to its risk management approach are warranted.

Dependencies affecting liquidation and realisation of the tokenised collateral

3.8. In assessing the liquidity characteristics of the collateral, including whether there is reliable access to outright sale or repurchase agreement (repo) markets under Rule 4.1(5) in the Collateral Part of the CCP Rulebook, a CCP should understand any dependencies that could affect its practical ability to liquidate, mobilise or otherwise realise the value of that collateral in normal and stressed conditions. Potential considerations may include:

  • dependencies on conversion between tokenised and non-tokenised forms;
  • dependencies on specific platforms, venues, custodians, service providers or market participants;
  • constraints on interoperability between tokenised and non-tokenised forms of collateral or across relevant infrastructure; and
  • governance arrangements or permissioning structures that could affect the transfer, mobilisation or liquidation of the tokenised collateral;
Credit and concentration risk

Credit risk arising from the tokenised collateral arrangement

3.9. A CCP should be able to demonstrate that it has considered and accounted for whether the tokenised collateral arrangement introduces additional or different sources of credit risk.

3.10. As an example of how an existing rule may apply in the tokenised collateral context, in assessing whether tokenised collateral meets the requirements of Rule 4.1(1) of the Collateral Part of the CCP Rulebook, which requires that a CCP may only accept a financial instrument as highly liquid collateral where it has been issued by an issuer that has low credit risk based upon an adequate internal assessment by the CCP employing a defined and objective methodology, a CCP should consider whether the tokenised collateral arrangement introduces additional entities whose creditworthiness could affect the value, transferability, redemption or realisation of the collateral. This may arise where the value, transferability or redemption of the tokenised collateral depends on entities other than those ordinarily associated with the asset itself. In such cases, a CCP should not assume that the tokenised collateral gives rise to the same credit risk profile as direct exposure to the underlying asset.

3.11. For instance, where a tokenised representation of a government bond is created by an entity other than the sovereign issuer, a CCP should consider whether its claim remains solely on the sovereign issuer or whether the tokenised collateral introduces a credit exposure to other entities.

3.12. A CCP should have a clear understanding of the credit risk it might face through a tokenised arrangement and should be able to demonstrate how this has been reflected in its internal credit assessment. For example, this could stem from:

  • entities responsible for creating or maintaining the tokenised representation of the asset (ie the tokeniser);
  • entities introduced by the tokenised arrangement that are not present in the corresponding non-tokenised arrangements, including platform providers, custodians, wallet or other service providers; and
  • the extent to which the failure of these entities could affect the value, transferability, redemption or realisation of the collateral.

Concentration risk within tokenised collateral arrangements

3.13. The same asset may be represented in both tokenised and non-tokenised form or tokenised by multiple entities. In establishing and managing concentration within collateral, a CCP should ensure that concentration assessments capture exposures to the same underlying issuer, guarantor or asset, irrespective of the form in which the collateral is represented. Any additional risks that arise from the tokenised collateral arrangement should be considered separately.

Settlement finality and legal certainty

Establishing certainty of ownership of the tokenised collateral

3.14. Different tokenised collateral arrangements may rely on different statutory, contractual or legal methods for settlement finality. Regardless of the approach, a CCP should understand the point at which transfers become final and irrevocable in the specific tokenised collateral arrangement, the legal or contractual arrangements supporting that outcome, and whether the arrangement provides sufficient certainty regarding ownership of the collateral in normal and stressed conditions.

3.15. For instance, where transfers are reflected on a distributed ledger but ownership records are also maintained by a central securities depository, a CCP should understand which record determines ownership and at what point ownership of the collateral becomes final and irrevocable. Where a token provides a representation of rights to an underlying asset held elsewhere, a CCP should also understand how ownership of both the token and any underlying asset would be evidenced and enforced and be able to demonstrate how this has been reflected in its assessment of the collateral. This could include consideration of:

  • how inconsistencies between records and balances represented across different ledgers, infrastructures or intermediaries may be identified and addressed;
  • who is accountable for maintaining, updating and validating the authoritative ownership record, and how those responsibilities, if performed by different entities, are allocated across the tokenised collateral arrangement;
  • where those functions are performed by different entities, how inconsistencies, errors or delays would be identified and addressed; and
  • how the overall tokenised collateral arrangement would continue to provide certainty of ownership, including in event of operational disruption or service provider failure.

3.16. A CCP should also consider whether any legal, contractual, governance, whitelisting or technical features of the tokenised collateral arrangement could affect its ability to establish, exercise or enforce its rights in respect of the collateral. As an example of how an existing rule may apply in a tokenised context, in assessing compliance with Rule 4.1(4) of the Collateral Part of the CCP Rulebook, which requires that collateral be freely transferable and free from legal restrictions that could impair liquidation, a CCP should understand whether such features could delay or restrict the liquidation or transfer of the collateral, including in a member default.

Operational resilience

Operational dependencies within the tokenised collateral arrangement

3.17. In line with all applicable rules and guidance, the Bank expects CCPs to understand the end-to-end operational arrangements supporting the tokenised collateral and any dependencies that could affect its security, integrity and availability. This may include understanding:

  • whether changes to a ledger, protocol, smart contract or permissioning arrangements, including those initiated by entities other than the CCP, could affect a CCP’s ability to access, transfer or mobilise the collateral;
  • whether the arrangement relies on interoperability or synchronisation between tokenised and conventional infrastructure, or between different tokenised infrastructures, and the extent to which these can be substituted or replaced; and
  • whether failure of any related interface, bridge or synchronisation mechanism could leave collateral inaccessible or immobilised during a disruption.

3.18. As an example of applying an existing rule in a tokenised context, Rules 2.1.1 and 2.1.7 in the Operational Resilience Part of the CCP Rulebook require a CCP to remain fully responsible for discharging its obligations where operational functions, services or activities are outsourced, and to retain sufficient expertise and resources to oversee those arrangements and manage the associated risks on an ongoing basis. Where a tokenised representation of a government bond is recorded on a third-party platform and linked to an underlying bond held at a CSD, reconciliation of records between the tokenised platform and the CSD may depend on a bridge operated by a third-party service provider. In accordance with the Rulebook, a CCP should consider whether disruption or failure of that service provider could affect the availability, integrity, transferability or realisation of the collateral. Where a CCP's ability to access, transfer or liquidate the collateral does rely on that bridge, a CCP should understand how those activities would continue in the event of disruption and whether alternative arrangements exist that enable the CCP to continue to access, transfer and realise the collateral in a timely way when required.

Managing disruption and maintaining access to the tokenised collateral

3.19. Where a tokenised collateral arrangement relies on various technologies or third parties, a CCP should also understand how the disruption or failure of those dependencies would be identified, managed and recovered from in practice.

3.20. In assessing how operational disruption could affect a tokenised collateral arrangement, a CCP should consider vulnerabilities in ledgers, smart contracts and other components of the arrangement. A CCP should also consider the maturity and effectiveness of the governance, security and control frameworks supporting the arrangement, as well as the potential impact of cyber incidents, technology failures or data integrity issues, including on a CCP’s own systems.

3.21. A CCP should understand and be able to demonstrate that it has factored any operational considerations into its assessment of the collateral as well as how effective control of tokenised collateral would be maintained or restored following a disruption. Relevant considerations may include whether disruption could leave the status or location of the collateral or any underlying assets uncertain; whether the loss, compromise or unavailability of cryptographic keys, digital credentials, wallets or permissions could prevent the CCP from exercising control over the collateral; whether automated functionality could continue operating or cease operating in an unintended manner during disruption. CCPs may also wish to consider whether extended or near-continuous operation could result in collateral positions changing unexpectedly at times when relevant market participants do not have the ability to monitor, manage or respond to those changes.

Custody and safeguarding

Safeguarding and controlling the tokenised collateral in normal and stressed conditions

3.22. A CCP should be able to demonstrate that it has considered how the tokenised collateral, including any underlying assets, is safeguarded, controlled and made available in normal and stressed conditions. This includes whether ownership rights, redemption rights and claims can be clearly evidenced and legally enforced, as well as whether the arrangements supporting the holding, control and accessing of the tokenised collateral can provide adequate protection against loss, misuse, unauthorised transfer or other compromise.

3.23. As an example of how an existing rule applies in a tokenised context, in assessing compliance with Rules 2.3(1) and 2.3(2) in the Investment Policy Part of the CCP Rulebook, which require financial instruments posted as margin or as default fund contributions to be deposited with an operator of a securities settlement system or, where this is not possible, held under other highly secure arrangements with a credit or financial institution, a CCP should understand how ownership, control and access to the collateral would be maintained in normal and stressed conditions. This includes where the arrangement relies on custodians, wallets, cryptographic keys or other third-party service providers.

3.24. For instance, where a CCP relies on a digital custodian to safeguard tokenised government bonds accepted as collateral and maintain the wallets or cryptographic keys needed to exercise control over that collateral, a CCP should consider whether the disruption, insolvency or withdrawal of authorisation of that custodian could impair its ability to access, transfer or realise the collateral. A CCP should understand how access would be maintained or restored if the custodian became unavailable, including whether alternative arrangements could enable the CCP to have direct access to the collateral where needed.

3.25. A CCP should understand and be able to demonstrate that it has factored custody and safeguarding considerations into its assessment of the collateral. This could include consideration of:

  • the insolvency or withdrawal of relevant authorisation of any entity responsible for safeguarding the tokenised collateral or any underlying assets;
  • circumstances in which the segregation, identification or recoverability of the tokenised collateral could be impaired;
  • the extent to which access to, control of or transfer of the tokenised collateral depends on the availability, integrity or control of cryptographic keys, credentials or other mechanisms; and
  • circumstances in which vulnerabilities in wallets, cryptographic key management, smart contracts or other components of the tokenised collateral arrangement could result in the loss, compromise, misappropriation or unauthorised transfer of collateral.

Legal Disclaimer:

EIN Presswire provides this news content "as is" without warranty of any kind. We do not accept any responsibility or liability for the accuracy, content, images, videos, licenses, completeness, legality, or reliability of the information contained in this article. If you have any complaints or copyright issues related to this article, kindly contact the author above.

Share this page:

Advanced Search Options

Search for:

Search scope:

Type:

Search in:

Date range:

The last

Sort by:

Sign up for:

Today in Banking

The daily local news briefing you can trust. Every day. Subscribe now.

By signing up, you agree to our Terms & Conditions.